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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the survival of federalism' has focused on de-
fining the extent to which the tenth amendment has any real
meaning after Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority.' The no-
tion that Justice Powell's dissent in Garcia marked "federalism's
obituary" must be weighed against the executive branch's increas-
ing emphasis on state's rights.' The balance reveals that federal
involvement in such areas as education, agriculture, commerce, and
health care has hardly declined,4 despite seven years of executive
rhetoric calling for increased state autonomy.
If states' rights are narrowing in the domestic sphere, they ap-
pear to be broadening in the realm of foreign policy. In an age
when the President has sought to speak with one voice and the
Congress with another, it is of no surprise that many states have
unilaterally attempted to answer certain questions of international
1. "Federalism" is the doctrine which embodies the distribution of powers between the
states and the federal government. More often, however, it is used synonymously with the
doctrine of "states' rights." For the purposes of this article, "federalism" will be used to
connote a broader vision of state's rights perennially balanced against the interests of the
federal government.
2. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
3. Cooper & Schwartz, Has the Supreme Court Destroyed Federalism?, A.B.A. J., May
1, 1987, at 42.
4. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601
(West Supp. 1989). This order, entitled "Federalism Considerations in Policy Formulation
and Implementation," lays out broad policy directives eliminating federal action, regulatory
as well as legislative, in all circumstances where states can care for themselves. The order
states that its purpose is to "restore the division of governmental responsibilities between
the national government and the states that was intended by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion." The order's reach has yet to be fully tested, but critics of this new policy directive
note that: "[T] he inability of this Administration to enact its federalism mandate into law is
a reflection of the fact that when the political smoke cleared, congressional constituencies
did not support the reduction of federal programs intended under the Administration's vi-
sion of federalism." See OMB Watch, "Federalism: A New Executive Order," Memorandum
of January 6, 1988.
5. R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 164-65 (1987).
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law.
The Constitution and custom preempt state action which af-
fect foreign policy. Indeed one of the primary purposes of the Con-
stitution was to provide for a unified voice in the area of foreign
policy. Nevertheless, states have always exercised some influence in
foreign relations.6 Historically, this influence has been limited to
areas such as jurisdiction over foreign corporations and regulation
of aliens employed within a state's borders. 7 In the last decade,
however, state involvement in foreign policy matters has extended
well beyond the traditional areas of commerce and labor. Today
states are actively seeking a role in policies on nuclear weapons,
immigration, deployment of a state's militia abroad in peacetime,
and negotiation of trade agreements with foreign governments.
States are using the federal courts and the ballot box to challenge
national foreign policy goals.' Hence a new federalism exists in the
United States, and it is one that has manifested itself in foreign
policy, an area that the Reagan Administration would have at least
anticipated.
The states' expanded role in foreign policy is the subject of
this article. Part II of this article will examine the traditional view
of federal preemption of state involvement in foreign affairs. With
regard to the making and implementation of foreign policy goals,
Part III will outline the analytical framework which places state
action vis-i-vis the federal government. Finally, Part IV will ex-
plore ways in which the courts have reviewed state intervention
into foreign affairs and examine the congressional and executive
power, if any, used to restrain this assertion of states' rights.
The new state activism in foreign affairs differs from earlier
efforts because it makes broader use of state police powers and bal-
lot initiatives. This article will examine whether increased state ac-
6. See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 228 (1972); P. HAY & R.
ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM, LEGAL INTEGRATION IN THE AMERICAN EXPE-
RIENCE 76-77 (1982).
7. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
8. Other examples of state activism in foreign affairs, to be discussed within this article,
include the following: states acting in violation of United States treaty obligations, e.g.,
United States v. City of Glen Cove, 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 450 F.2d 884
(2d Cir. 1971); states making policy on deployment of the National Guard in peacetime,
Perpich v. United States Dep't of Defense, 666 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Minn. 1987), aff'd, 880
F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 715 (1990); and states
making their own trade agreements with foreign governments in contravention of the Logan
Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 744 (1948) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1988)). See
Tolchin & Tolchin, Cultivating Japan, Wash. Post, Mar. 6, 1988, at C2, col. 1.
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tivism in foreign relations has created fragmentary relief on some
issues which affect both the states and the nation. Such activism
may have also overshadowed a more strained relationship between
the Executive and Congress in the area of foreign affairs in the
post-Vietnam era. By reviewing the recent court decisions, newspa-
per articles, and other relevant literature one can begin docu-
menting the states' realignment of their traditional role in the for-
eign policy process.
II. SUPREMACY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: BACKGROUND
Traditional wisdom commits the foreign policy making powers
of the United States to the federal government, with overlapping
powers divided between Congress and the Executive.9 In particu-
lar, the Constitution explicitly withholds important foreign affairs
powers from the states. States are forbidden to make treaties, to
impose duties on exports and imports, to maintain military forces,
to engage in war, and to participate in separate alliances.1 0
Only Congress can regulate foreign commerce1 and immigra-
tion; 2 only the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, can ratify treaties." The Supremacy Clause makes all le-
gislation, as well as treaties with foreign nations which are entered
into by the President and ratified by the Senate, binding on the
states."
The exclusive power of the federal government to conduct for-
eign policy predates the adoption of the Constitution. It is based
"upon the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several
their people in respect of foreign affairs were one."' 5 Moreover, "as
a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies acting
as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
9. See L. HENKIN, supra note 6; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 4-6, at 230,
§ 5-16, at 353, § 6-21, at 468 (2d ed. 1988).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
11. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
12. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
13. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
14. Id. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause also makes all federal legislation binding
upon the states.
15. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
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America."' Yet it was precisely the inability of the federal govern-
ment to control the individual states vis-&-vis their relations with
foreign nations that rendered the Articles of Confederation useless
and prompted the drafting of a federal constitution. 7 Indeed, in
the Federalist Papers, James Madison argued that the new nation
should adopt a unified approach in the conduct of foreign affairs.
He urged that "if we are to be one nation in any respect it clearly
ought to be in respect to other nations."'"
A. The Executive
History has underscored the need for a centralized approach
to foreign policy. The Constitution of the United States provides
various techniques for achieving this unified voice.' 9 For example,
the Executive, under Article II, retains a central voice in the artic-
ulation of foreign policy.20 Executive supremacy in foreign affairs
was also reinforced by the relationship between the President and
Congress until the early 1970s.
Post-World War II America marked the ascendancy of the ex-
ecutive branch in the foreign policy process.21 This bipartisan con-
sensus set the tone for the President to use military force and to
commit troops abroad without the consent of the Congress, as pro-
vided by our constitutional design. Some scholars consider the con-
gressional passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1965 to
16. Id. at 316.
17. L. HENKIN, supra note 6. "Even in the Articles of Confederation the states had left
themselves little independent authority in foreign relations, and eliminating that little was a
principal purpose of the Constitutional fathers." Id. at 227. See also A. SOFAER, WAR, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 16 (1976).
18. THE FEDERALIST no. 42, at 181 (J. Madison) (C. Beard ed. 1948). See id. nos. 3, 4, 5,
22 & 80 for discussions of the foreign affairs power of the new nation.
19. See generally Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248. See
also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10; art. 1, § 10, cls. 1, 3; art. 1I, §§ 2, 3; art. III, § 2; art. VI,
cl. 2.
20. As enumerated in the Constitution, the presidential powers include receiving and
appointing ambassadors, making treaties with the advice and power consent of the Senate,
and a broad catchall derived from the "Necessary and Proper" Clause. See generally U.S.
CONST. art. II.
21. For example, such policies as the Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO), and containment were easily ratified by Congress. J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER,
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 106 (2d ed. 1987). "[Tjhere
was a fairly widespread consensus in Congress as well as in successive presidencies that the
checks and balances that were the essence of American Constitutional design were simply
not adequate to the tasks of world leadership." Id.
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mark the pinnacle of congressional deference.22
B. The Congress
To understand the roots of greater state involvement in the
foreign policy process, one must examine the shift that occurred in
the executive-legislative relationship in the early 1970s. Congress'
attempt to reassert Article I powers over the foreign policy making
process was evidenced by the War Powers Resolution of 1973.3
This resolution, perceived as a statutory springboard to challenge
executive actions, marked a high point of the reaction against exec-
utive adventurism.2 4
Where the War Powers Act failed to wrest foreign policy
power from the Executive to Congress, the Watergate investiga-
tions and the elections of 1974 succeeded. The new Congress of
1974 ushered in. a group of legislators no longer completely defer-
ential to presidential leadership. The result was a Congress that
was fragmented by the emergence of new committees, new leader-
ship, and numerous autonomous policy making bodies. Fragmenta-
tion of policy was particularly apparent in the areas of foreign af-
fairs and defense.25 By the 1980s, Congress was deadlocked on
matters of foreign policy due to a lack of consensus among the
public and foreign policy experts.2 6
The executive branch also suffered from a lack of coherent vi-
sion of the foreign policy process. While the absence of a common
ground with Congress created a divided voice in foreign affairs, the
executive branch in the post-Vietnam decade was also challenged
by an electorate that manifested a stronger interest in foreign pol-
icy. United States citizens were aware that policy differences-ex-
isted between the Executive and Congress in areas such as deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons and sanctuary for refugees. They were
also unwilling to see apartheid remain the status quo in South Af-
rica. These issues as well as others have become prime targets of
22. Id. at 109.
23. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
24. Id. at 114. The question of Congress' ability to use the War Powers act to thwart
executive action draws attention to the political question doctrine. A hesitant Supreme
Court has been reluctant to resolve controversies between the branches on domestic as well
as foreign policy matters. See Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
25. J. NATHAN & J. OLIVER, supra note 21, at 120-21.
26. Id. at 125.
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state and local actions in the absence of executive or legislative
initiative and in response to what some would perceive as wrong or
failed initiatives. Cities and states are setting their own challenges
to national policy through initiatives and referenda, through court
challenges to federal law and through state police powers.27
C. The Courts
Courts reinforce federal supremacy in foreign relations. Some
of the earliest cases deny states unilateral power to interact with
foreign nations.2 8 More recent pronouncements reiterate the need
for the federal government to speak with one voice in the area of
foreign relations. The Supreme Court buttressed this through deci-
sions which effectively declare that states have little or no power to
affect American foreign relations.29 In United States v. Belmont,3"
the Court stated emphatically that "in respect of all international
negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations
generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of
New York does not exist.""1 This idea is reiterated in United
States v. Pink which states that the foreign relations power is not
shared by the federal government with the states.3 "
Despite case law and its doctrinal statements which favor the
federal government's exclusive jurisdiction in foreign affairs, there
still exists some uncertainty regarding the relationship between
state policies and the national foreign relations power.33 This situa-
tion is most evident where the federal courts have carved out ex-
ceptions for independent state action, in cases such as those in-
volving the court created doctrines of the "dormant Commerce
Clause" and "dormant Foreign Policy Clause."
27. The States Passing the Buck, EcoNOMIST, Aug. 5, 1989, at 25-26.
28. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236-37 (1796)(the international agreement
power is not limited by any powers reserved to the states).
29. L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 228.
30. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
31. Id. at 331.
32. "We repeat that there are limitations on the sovereignty of the States. No State can
rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own domestic policies. Power over external af-
fairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively." United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
33. Moore, supra note 19, at 249.
34. "But where foreign affairs begin to touch the States, whether in their particular
economic interest (as in issues of free trade versus protectionism) or even in small matters
of pride or prejudice or principle, the plenary powers of the national government take on all
the colors of federalism." L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 247.
1989]
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The evolution of the Court's thinking about the state preemp-
tion of interstate commerce has given rise to the "dormant Com-
merce Clause." Under the Constitution, Congress has the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and with states.3 5 When
Congress exercises its affirmative power, the Supremacy Clause
voids conflicting state actions.3" Congress' affirmative power to
control interstate and foreign commerce contains an implicit au-
thority to restrain state governments from interfering with the flow
of interstate commerce. 37 What the courts have made clear to the
states is that even in the absence of congressional legislation, "the
Commerce Clause contains an implied limitation on the power of
the states to interfere with or impose burdens on interstate
commerce.
38
The proscription of states' interference with interstate com-
merce, and foreign affairs, has a loophole. Congress cannot prevent
states from exercising their police powers to protect the health and
safety of its citizens.3 Thus, statutes enacted under the guise of
police power that impact on interstate commerce pose a difficult
task for the Court.' 0
Since 1970 the Court has approached state regulation of inter-
state commerce by a balancing test described in Pike v. Bruce
Church."' The most current doctrinal exposition of this test oc-
curred in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap.4' In Alexandria Scrap the
Court expounded a "market participant doctrine" governing state
35. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cis. 1, 3.
36. Id. art. VI, cl. 2.
37. L. TRIBE, supra note 9, § 6-2, at 403.
38. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652
(1981). The Court tells us that the Constitution itself excludes such state intrusions even
when the federal branches have not acted. "While political branches might prescribe for
particular cases or even provide some guidelines, as under the Commerce Clause, it will be
largely for the courts and will take many years and many cases to develop the distinctions
and draw lines that will define the new limitations on the States." L. HENKIN, supra note 6,
at 239.
39. Contributors to the Pa. Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917)(police
powers of the states are inalienable).
40. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
41, "Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. . . .If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of de-
gree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature
of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities." Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
42. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
[Vol. 21:1
FOREIGN POLICY
participation in the market place. The Court determined that the
Commerce Clause did not prohibit a state from favoring its own
citizens when it participates in the market."' This doctrine does
not apply to foreign commerce."
A similar doctrine which emerges for federal preemption of
state actions in foreign affairs is the "dormant Foreign Policy
Clause." Because the Constitution itself excludes such state intru-
sions, even when the federal branches have not acted, it would
seem that the states are virtually powerless to express an indepen-
dent course in foreign affairs.4" Yet states have continued to enact
laws which affect our foreign relations and it is the "dormant For-
eign Policy Clause" that requires a court to determine the effect
that a state statute will have.
Similar to the balancing tests developed for the "dormant
Commerce Clause" cases, the Supreme Court has employed a bal-
ancing process for the "dormant Foreign Policy Clause" in two
cases: Clark v. Allen4 6 and Zschernig v. Miller.47 Both cases deal
with state laws affecting inheritance of real or personal property by
aliens.' 8 Out of Zschernig emerged a two part constitutionality test
for state statutes with an impact on foreign policy: 1) the statute
must constitute a proper response to the risks, financial and other-
wise, distinctly affecting the locality; and 2) the statute must not
interfere with the foreign affairs power of the federal government
by providing for an evaluation of the conduct of a foreign govern-
ment. If a state statute complies with both of these conditions, fed-
eral preemption under the "dormant Foreign Policy Clause" does
not occur.' 9
Actions arising out of state law or out of a state's police power
challenge the federal power to preempt a state's regulation of com-
merce or foreign affairs. Nowhere in the Constitution is the term
43. Id. at 810.
44. Kenworthy, The Constitutionality of State Buy-American Laws, 50 UMKC L. REv.
1, 18-19 (1981).
45. L. HENKIN, supra note 6, at 239.
46. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
47. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
48. P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 120.
49. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Local Di-
vestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REv. 469, 509-12 (1987). "The dormant foreign policy
power requires a court to determine the likely affect on foreign policy that a state statute
will have." Id. at 509. See also Zschernig, supra note 47. Justice Douglas stated that "[I]t
seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international
relations in a persistent and subtle way." Id. at 440 (emphasis added).
1989]
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"police power" used, but the Supreme Court used the concept to
legitimize state action vis-&-vis federal law. Under the test devised
over a century ago in Cooley v. Board of Wardens,5 the Supreme
Court recognized that under certain circumstances exclusive con-
gressional power is appropriate while at other times concurrent
state regulation is acceptable. 1 This rule of "selective exclusive-
ness" adopted in Cooley set the standard of review for state legis-
lation of commerce in the absence of federal legislation.2
The analytical standard for preemption when states attempt
to regulate the conduct of foreign affairs through the use of state
police powers is articulated in Hines v. Davidowitz"5  and
Zschernig.5 The problem in all cases involving preemption of com-
merce or foreign affairs powers is in the separation of state actions,
which may be construed as legitimate exercises of state police pow-
ers, from those which are specific incursions into federal legislative
territory. Often the subtle task is to define the bounds of police
power where its exercise intrudes upon interstate commerce.55
The role that states have continued to play in the foreign rela-
tions of this nation appears to have expanded in the last decade."e
If the 1960s called into question the efficacy of federal controls
over foreign relations," then the 1980s require a reexamination of
how, in the absence of a strong federal leadership in foreign affairs,
the states have been successful in asserting a true vox populi in
matters of international concern.
50. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852).
51. P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 80.
52. "The doctrine of selective exclusiveness in Cooley stipulates that if the item is such
that national uniformity is necessitated, then Congressional power is exclusive. If, on the
other hand, the item is representative of a peculiarly local concern (even though within the
reach of the Commerce Clause) warranting a diversity of treatment, then concurrent state
regulation is authorized in the absence of Congressional preemption." Id. at 81.
53. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
54. Zschernig, supra note 47.
55. Lewis, supra note 49, at 476.
56. "Policy initiatives during the first four years of the Reagan administration, either
by design or by accident, shifted the focus in certain policy areas to states and locali-
ties. . .Moreover, even areas of traditional or inherent national concern, such as arms con-
trol and foreign policy, received the attention of both states and localities. Whether through
legislation or ballot measures, the states and localities focused on new areas of concern dur-
ing Reagan's first term of office." Holcomb, State and Local Politics During the Reagan
Era: Citizen Group Responses, in STATE POLITICS AND THE NEw FEDERALISM: READINGS AND
COMMENTARY 121 (M. Gittell ed. 1986).
57. Moore, supra note 19, at 250-51.
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IIl. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: THREE WAYS THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT VIEWS STATE BEHAVIOR
Three modes of behavior define federal government reaction
to state incursions into the area of foreign relations: the traditional
mode, the activist mode, and the neutral mode. All three forms of
behavior can be documented over time in the relations between the
federal government and the states. There are no bright lines be-
tween any of the three behavioral modes. The federal government
may shift back and forth from one form of behavior to another
even though the merits of the issue being challenged may not
change. Thus, where states have involved themselves in matters of
foreign relations, the federal government's neutrality on a given is-
sue can easily turn into either active support or active opposition
depending on the timing and circumstances of a particular state's
behavior.
A. The Traditional Mode
Within the traditional model of federalism, the role of the
states in the conduct of foreign affairs has been so limited by the
national government as to be almost non-existent." Under the
traditional mode, the response of the federal government is to con-
sistently oppose unilateral state actions. In this mode, the execu-
tive branch maintains the strict constitutional formalism of the
supremacy in foreign policy matters, with Congress deferring to
the Executive so that the nation speaks with one voice. The Su-
preme Court has continued to strike down state laws that conflict
with federal objectives or touch upon a dominant federal interest.
Since 1936., supporters of the traditional interpretation of execu-
tive supremacy rely on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp. 9 as the basis for rejection of any unilateral action by the
states or by Congress in the area of foreign affairs. Not surpris-
ingly, most states' attempts to challenge the federal government
are easily dismissed on political question grounds before ever
reaching the merits.
A new trend within this traditional mode is for states to chal-
lenge particular federal actions by exploiting specific statutory ob-
ligations which inhibit federal action in certain areas of foreign af-
58. See Betmont, supra note 30, at 331.
59. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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fairs. Such statutory loopholes provide states and citizen groups
with a vehicle to voice broader foreign policy objections. In their
consideration of such challenges as the federal government's failure
to meet environmental impact reporting requirements or other ob-
ligatory standards, federal courts have heard issues that extend
well beyond the mere violation of the specific law. Most recent ex-
amples of such activism can be seen in the lawsuits by anti-nuclear
groups or by those who favor political asylum for refugees fleeing
Central America. While these suits often fail to obtain relief in the
form of changes in foreign policy, they do get a judicial forum be-
cause the cases involve a particular federal statute rather than a
"political question" per se.
B. The Activist Mode
In cases where certain state actions may promote a foreign
policy objective, the federal government has often given consent to
state action. 0 Most cases falling into this category involve local re-
actions to Cold War politics. Although Zschernig might be the ex-
ception, in several cases states used their police power to lash out
at international communism. 1 Such situations, especially in the
controversial area of "Buy-American" laws, have created special
problems for the courts.
6 2
C. The Neutral Mode
Three trends embody the neutral mode of federal government
response. In its general neutral stance, the federal government tol-
erates the state actions such as declaring celebrations in the name
of foreign leaders or passing non-binding resolutions in support of
opposition groups in countries where the United States retains
diplomatic relations. These actions are deemed neutral in that the
federal government neither supports nor prohibits this form of
state intrusion in foreign affairs.
A second form of behavior is more troubling to the federal
government in its neutral stance. State or local governments, under
60. Moore, supra note 19, at 312-14.
61. Zschernig, supra note 47, must be compared with Clark, supra note 46, because of
the nature of the type of wording and goal that each of these state inheritance statutes
contained.
62. Lewis, supra note 49, at 485-86.
[Vol. 21:1
FOREIGN POLICY
the guise of their police powers, actively embark on the promotion
of policies which could affect the conduct of foreign affairs which,
on their face, appear to be intrusions into the federal role in for-
eign policy. State and local actions regarding divestment of govern-
ment funds from companies dealing with South Africa is one of the
more recent examples of this trend. Another example is the crea-
tion of sanctuaries for refugees from Central America in cities or
states. In the latter example, the federal government has been less
willing to engage in court battles against community leaders, even
though political asylum is a decision clearly delegated to federal
authorities, specifically to the Department of State.
A third trend of state activity where the federal government is
neutral has been through the ballot box. The 1980s have been a
decade of increasing use of initiative and referenda procedures.
Such ballot initiatives have given local communities an opportu-
nity to vote on matters of foreign policy in non-binding resolu-
tions. Foreign policy issues such as U.S.-Soviet arms control efforts
(the nuclear freeze votes and the nuclear free zone movements),
United States aid to the Nicaraguan opposition (the anti-Contra
referenda), and United States policy toward apartheid in South
Africa have all appeared on the ballots in state elections through-
out the nation.
The importance of such grassroots movements is underscored
by the neutral stance that the federal government has taken with
regard to these activities. On the one hand, the ability of citizens
to express support or opposition to foreign policy goals is a testi-
mony to free speech and to the open society in which we live. On
the other hand, such movements must still be examined within the
framework of federalism so as to help understand the role states
can and will play in the making of foreign policy at the end of this
century.
IV. CASE STUDIES OF STATE BEHAVIOR
A. The Traditional Mode
In United States v. Glen Cove, 3 the tax commissioner of a
small town on Long Island, New York, tried to assess property
taxes on the residence of the Soviet Representative to the United
63. 322 F. Supp. 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Nations. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enjoined the
action," affirming the district court which held that a municipality
cannot collect property taxes on property which is owned by a for-
eign nation and which is used for purposes that render it exempt
from taxation under a consular convention. 5
Eighteen years have passed since Glen Cove, but cases in the
intervening years have proven that executive supremacy is pre-
dominant when United States foreign policy objectives are chal-
lenged. Even the Senate, whose constitutional role of advice and
consent in treaty making is so clearly defined, cannot override a
presidential decision that abrogates a treaty approved earlier by
that body.6 6 The federal government and the courts retain the
right to interpret whether a state's legislation is incidental to or
has a direct impact on the conduct of foreign affairs. In the last
decade, the states have exhibited a renewed interest in foreign af-
fairs, exemplified by governors speaking out on national issues and
local governments enacting their own laws which directly effect
federal policies. The United States Congress has demonstrated a
renewed activism in that Representatives have utilized the courts
to challenge executive actions deemed contrary to congressional
foreign policy goals. The courts have determined such actions to be
non-justiciable on the basis of the political question doctrine. In all
cases where states have initiated litigation to stop the implementa-
tion of federal policies, however, the states have lost. 7
64. 450 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1971).
65. "In the exercise of its constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs,
the United States may sue to prevent state action which would violate a treaty obligation of
the United States." 322 F. Supp. at 152.
66. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The Court relied on the Baker analysis for
political questions:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; [2] or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; [3] or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; [41 or the im-
possibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; [5] or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; [6] or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various de-
partments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
The Court ruled that the President had the power to abrogate a treaty, notwithstanding
the Senate's objection. This decision represents the most traditional way for the Court to
avoid an inter-branch dispute.
67. In 1970, the State of Massachusetts sued the Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, to
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During the 1980s, state and municipal government actions
have challenged federal authority in the area of foreign policy."8
These challenges made creative use of statutory requirements un-
related to foreign policy that provide a jurisdictional opening for
such challenges. Thus, in these cases, the courts are less likely to
invoke the political question doctrine to avoid judicial review. In-
stead, based on the merits of the particular case, the courts main-
tain the traditional result of federal supremacy.
1. United States Nuclear Policy
In the last eight years, the issue of United States nuclear pol-
icy has pitted state and local governments directly against the Ex-
ecutive and Congress. Under traditional constitutional law and le-
gal history, state involvement in such an issue is automatically
preempted by Congress' plenary power to declare war and the
Executive's authority as Commander-in-Chief. 5  Nevertheless,
through creative lawsuits that avoid the political question doctrine,
grassroots organizations have been partially victorious in challeng-
ing the deployment of nuclear missiles. For example, the federal
requirement that new arms procurements include an arms control
impact statement has opened the door to new litigation. 0 Even
more compelling are state challenges to deployment of the United
States nuclear arsenal based on the Department of Defense's fail-
obtain an adjudication of the constitutionality of the U.S. participation in the Indochina
war. Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). While the Court denied the state the
opportunity to be heard, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Harlan dissented. Douglas argued
in his dissent that Massachusetts would have been granted standing and the matter at issue
was justiciable. Douglas stated in this case:
The rationale in cases such as the present is that the government cannot take
life, liberty, or property of the individual and escape adjudication by the courts
of the legality of its actions. This is the heart of this case. It does not concern
the wisdom of fighting in Southeast Asia. Likewise, no question of whether the
conflict is either just or necessary is present. We are asked instead, whether the
Executive has power, absent a congressional declaration of war, to commit Mas-
sachusetts citizens to armed hostilities on foreign soil. Another way of putting
the question is whether under our Constitution, presidential wars are
permissible.
Id. at 896.
68. See Holcomb, supra note 56, at 121.
69. L. Henkin, United States Nuclear Defense Policy: The Constitutional Framework,
(November 1987) (unpublished paper presented at National Defense University, Seminar on
National Security, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C.).
70. See Min, Toward More Intelligent National Security Policy Making: The Case for
Reform of Arms Control Impact Statements, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV, 174 (1986).
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ure to include final environmental impact statements (FEIS) in
proposed projects such as the MX missile."'
In Lamm v. Weinberger,72 the Governor of Colorado, Richard
Lamm, along with environmental and anti-nuclear groups, 73 chal-
lenged the adequacy of the MX missile project's FEIS, required by
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).7 " The United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska held that the
claims were barred by the political question doctrine.75
The Eighth Circuit heard two appeals in this particular case.
In the first decision, the court held that the issue was justiciable.
The court considered whether the Air Force was required to file a
FEIS on three types of basing modes for all MX missiles. These
modes included basing for immediate missile deployment, basing
for missiles proposed for deployment, and alternative basing for
alternative modes. The court was willing to grant declaratory and
injunctive relief for the claims regarding the environmental impact
of basing the 100 proposed missiles. It refused to consider the ac-
tual or alternative mode question. In justifying its decision, the
court mentioned that some courts have refrained from issuing in-
junctions in cases where national defense was concerned, those
cases were heard on the merits.
The Air Force petitioned for a rehearing of the Lamm deci-
sion, an en banc hearing was ordered, and the Lamm decision was
vacated. 6 In the resulting case, Romer v. Carlucci,77 the court re-
considered Colorado's challenges to the adequacy of an environ-
mental impact statement for all three basing modes. In yet another
decision in favor of Colorado, the Romer court sitting en banc, up-
held the justiciability of two of the three basing mode questions,
basing its decision on the requirements for a FEIS mandated by
71. Id. at 178; but cf. Friends of the Earth v. Weinberger, 562 F. Supp. 265 (D.D.C.
1983), where a similar challenge based on an alleged violation of National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) resulted in a motion to dismiss.
72. 819 F.2d 1145 (8th Cir. 1987). This case was withdrawn from the bound volume
because rehearing en banc was granted and the opinion vacated. 825 F.2d 176 (8th Cir.
1987).
73. The groups included: Western Solidarity Tri-State MX Coalition, Friends of the
Earth Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, Coalition for a Liveable World, and Environ-
mental Action.
74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
75. 847 F.2d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1988).
76. 825 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1987).
77. 847 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1988).
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the statute." In Romer, the court's decision to remand differed
from the willingness in Lamm to grant outright injunctive relief.
The Romer court mandated that the claims of the state and envi-
ronmental group be reviewed, "with all the rigor and scrutiny re-
quired by law."79 The Romer court, in its rejection of the appellee's
demands to review whether or not Congress had intended the
FEIS to cover alternative basing modes, made an important dis-
tinction between international and wartime use of missiles. The
majority decision that alternative basing was a non-reviewable area
caused Judge Arnold and two other judges, in a partial dissent, to
comment that in view of NEPA doctrine and policy, the language
of the NEPA itself, fails to support such a conclusion. 0
The significance of the Romer decision depends on its impact
on a future plaintiff's ability to influence national security matters.
If a court follows the dicta of Judge Arnold's concurrence in
Romer,"1 it is clear that the decision breaks new ground in avoiding
dismissal based on political question grounds.
In Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan,8 2 the
court chose a more traditional approach to outsiders' ability to in-
fluence the foreign policy. The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint by the
plaintiffs, who among others, consisted of an antinuclear group and
two U.S. congressmen, alleging that the deployment by the United
States of cruise missiles in England would create a substantial risk
of a nuclear accident or nuclear war initiated by either the United
States or the Soviet Union. The court held that this issue was non-
justiciable because it presented a political question and went on to
state:
[T] his court is not asked to determine the foreign policy of the
United States. Plaintiffs do not ask this court to decide the wis-
dom, morality or efficacy of the decision to deploy cruise mis-
78. Id. at 463.
79. Id. at 447.
80. Id. at 471.
81. Id. at 464.
I agree fully with much of the Court's opinion. Specifically, I agree that the po-
litical-question doctrine does not make this case non-justiciable. The case is
nothing more than an exercise in statutory interpretation, the kind of work that
courts routinely do every day. The outcome of the case will have national secur-
ity and foreign policy implications, but that is true of many lawsuits that are
undeniably well within the judicial purview.
Id.
82. 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
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siles at Greenham Common. The responsibility for that decision
lies with the Executive and Legislative branches of government.
Plaintiffs ask this court to determine the legality of the chal-
lenged action. In particular, they ask this court to adjudicate
torts, to protect constitutional rights of citizens and non-citizens
under United States control, and to enforce the constitutional
mandate of separation of powers. The Constitution commits the
resolution of these issues to the courts, and not to a coordinate
political department.8
3
Despite this statement, the court, in a very circular opinion,
returned to the six-part test of Baker v. Carr.8 4 The Greenham
court concluded that while the judiciary was the appropriate
branch to create a remedy for this type of action, the remedy
sought, an order enjoining the deployment of cruise missiles, would
clearly impinge upon the national security and foreign policy pow-
ers of the President. According to the court, these powers are tex-
tually committed by the Constitution to the political branch of
government. 5 While the court in Greenham did recognize the role
of the judiciary in adjudicating torts and protecting citizens, its
ruling could not reverse the foreign policy decision by the Execu-
tive and Congress to deploy cruise missiles.8 "
Greenham is difficult to reconcile with Lamm, in that the de-
cisions adopt different approaches to the principle that the judici-
ary is not the forum to challenge the foreign policy powers of the
Congress and the Executive. Greenham disallows such interven-
tion, based on the traditional notion that the judiciary should not
interfere with foreign policy powers textually committed to the
President. Lamm and Romer, however, by granting the state gover-
nor an injunction against the deployment of MX missiles, expand
the possibilities for the exercise of local control over questions con-
cerning national defense."
83. Id. at 1336.
84. See Baker, supra note 24, at 217.
85. Greenham, 591 F. Supp. at 1335-39.
86. Citizen efforts to enjoin the executive or legislative branch from carrying out a nu-
clear weapons program is not a new issue. In Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964), over 100 citizens and eight Nobel laureates sought
to enjoin the United States from nuclear weapons tests. The court dismissed the action as
one where large matters of basic national policy, as of foreign policy, come into play. 331
F.2d at 798.
87. Cf. INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 942-43 (1983)("But the presence of constitutional
issues with significant political overtones does not automatically invoke the political ques-
tion doctrine.") In Jackson County, Missouri v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1977) the
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2. Cases Against Nuclear Protesters
Among the cases that have arisen from the anti-nuclear move-
ment in the 1980s, United States v. Dorrell8 stands out because of
the court's discussion of alternative ways to change national policy
without resorting to violence. In denying the defendant the use of
a "necessity defense" for his destruction of government property, a
nuclear missile assembly plant, the Ninth Circuit concluded that:
"[t]he defense of necessity does not arise from a 'choice' of several
sources of actions; it is instead based on a real emergency ...
Consequently, if there was a reasonable, legal alternative to violat-
ing the law, the defense fails .... ,,89 In DorreUi, the defendant had
such an alternative.
Although it is doubtful that the defendant could have brought
a legal challenge to United States nuclear policy, he did have re-
course to the political process to redress his concerns regarding nu-
clear war. "There are thousands of opportunities for the propaga-
tion of the antinuclear message: in the nation's electoral process;
by speech on public streets, in parks, in auditoriums, in churches
and lecture halls, and by release of information to the media, to
name only a few. '
While this case had the expected outcome (i.e., the defendant
was convicted for willfully injuring property of the United States),
the court's discussion of grassroots alternatives to voice opposition
to national policies is notable. It is almost prescient that the court
should enumerate this list, given that the 1980s have witnessed all
of the above listed methods of allowing the public to have a voice
in the foreign policy of the United States.
court held that "there was no national defense exemption from NEPA." Id. at 1007. The
issue in Jackson County however, concerned the relocation of a military installation, not the
deployment of nuclear missiles.
88. 758 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 431.
90. Id. at 432. (quoting United States v. Quilty, 741 F.2d 1031, 1033 (7th Cir. 1984)).
Other cases against the MX missile include: United States v. Allen, 760 F.2d 447 (2d Cir.
1985) where the plaintiffs argued that nuclearism is a religion, and thus United States policy
which establishes nuclearism violates the first amendment; United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d
580 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987) where the plaintiffs argued that their
Christian faith requires them to accept personal responsibility for ending the cycle of vio-
lence in the world.
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3. United States Policy in Central America
Aggressive United States foreign policy goals, such as the re-
sponse to a communist threat in Central America, have colored
this nation's approach to hemispheric relations in the 1980s. In or-
der to displace corrupt regimes where violations of human rights
are common, members of Congress have sought to enjoin the exec-
utive branch from military actions in Central America. In Crockett
v. Reagan,1 members of Congress sought declaratory judgments of
the actions of the President and the Secretaries of State and De-
fense in supplying military aid to El Salvador. The plaintiffs al-
leged violations of the War Powers Resolution and the Foreign As-
sistance Act. The court held that the War Powers violation was
non-justiciable as a political question and that the Foreign Assis-
tance Act issue was non-justiciable under the "equitable discre-
tion" doctrine.2 It was not unusual for the court to dismiss this
action as partially implicating a political question, nevertheless, by
invoking the "equitable discretion" doctrine, the court was sending
a clear message that it would entertain a similar action if the mat-
ter could not be resolved through the legislative process or if the
plaintiffs could prove an unconstitutional action. 3 In this instance,
the court was unwilling to involve itself in a dispute among legisla-
tors on what the correct policy should be.
One of the most serious challenges to the Reagan Administra-
tion's actions in Central America was launched by a group of gov-
ernors. In Perpich v. United States Department of Defense,94 the
Governor and the State of Minnesota attacked the federal deploy-
ment of state National Guards to Central America for training pur-
poses. The issue in the case was whether, under Sections 672(b)
and 672(d) of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, as amended
in 1986 by the Montgomery Amendment,95 Congress could author-
ize such training missions of the Guard without the consent of the
state's governor.9 Specifically, the governor claimed that the
Montgomery Amendment, which restricts the power of state gover-
91. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aft d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1251 (1984). Cf. Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd,
770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
92. Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d at 1357.
93. Id.
94. See Perpich, 666 F. Supp. at 1319.
95. 10 U.S.C. §§ 671-689 (1982), amended by 10 U.S.C. § 672(f)(1988).
96. See supra note 94, at 1321.
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nors to withhold consent to federal deployment of the National
Guard of the United States, impinged on a state's authority to
train its own militia.97 The federal district court granted summary
judgment for the Department of Defense, finding that Congress'
authority to train the National Guard while the Guard is in active
federal service arises under the militia clause98 and preempts the
states' veto that arises under Sections 672(b) and 672(d). This de-
cision was reversed on appeal, but was vacated shortly thereafter
for a rehearing en banc. Subsequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Montgomery Amend-
ment is a constitutional exercise of plenary and exclusive congres-
sional power over the Army.9
In Dukakis v. United States Department of Defense, 00 Mas-
sachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis also challenged the order to
deploy the state's militia for a training mission in Central America.
The United States District Court in Massachusetts, like the Min-
nesota district court in Perpich, upheld the constitutionality of the
Montgomery Amendment. The Massachusetts district court was
more reluctant than the Minnesota district court to declare the
Militia Clause as "never in any circumstances [limiting] Congress'
power . . . to call militia units to active duty."'' Nevertheless, it is
noteworthy that the decision still followed the traditional approach
by barring state intervention in foreign policy matters. 2
The restriction of federalism in foreign policy has not halted
the use of the judiciary to review claims by states and individuals
on such matters.' 0 ' The willingness of some federal courts to re-
view matters integrally tied to U.S. foreign policy goals, particu-
larly if the challenges to such goals enter a court's jurisdiction as
97. Id. at 1322.
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 12, 16.
99. Perpich, 880 F.2d at 11. See also US. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cis. 12, 16.
100. Dukakis v. United States Dept. of Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1988).
101. Id. at 36.
102. In Dukakis, which was joined to Perpich for purposes of appeal, the court stated:
One more point-implicit in all that has been said above-is best made explicit.
In general, disputes are to be resolved through political processes (rather than in
courts) where in essence they are disputes as to whether particular calls of units
of the militia to temporary active duty, and the locations to which units are sent
and during such a period, do or do not serve national interests. . . .The record
before this court falls short of presenting a case in which judicial intrusion would
be appropriate.
686 F. Supp. at 38.
103. Control of National Guard a Federalism Issue, NAT'L J., Feb. 14, 1987, at 388.
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federal questions, becomes apparent from the above cases. Courts
are more likely to review the merits of these challenges if the im-
plementation of foreign policy goals involve statutory schemes.
Whether the Air Force can base its MX missiles in Colorado is as
much a question of interpreting NEPA as it is a question of United
States national defense policy. The same can be said with regard to
the National Guard training questions. The court was asked to
pass judgment upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress vis-
A-vis a state's second amendment right to maintain a militia in
peacetime.
Many of these cases served a subsidiary goal, even though the
courts failed to grant the remedies plaintiffs sought. They brought
issues of national concern to public attention. Each governor, by
questioning the use of the state militia, raised doubts as to the wis-
dom of United States policies in Central America. Through this
state-led notoriety, the objectives of the traditional mode of action
where the federal government successfully defeats a state's chal-
lenge to a national foreign policy objective, is only partially ful-
filled. Defeat in the courtroom appears not to have deterred the
states from seeking some voice in the foreign policy-making pro-
cess, whether the process results in an actual voice or merely the
public's general awareness of misguided federal policies.
Ironically, Congress has opened the door to the challenges
states and citizen groups have raised to federal policies. One unin-
tended outcome of the congressional reforms of the 1970s has been
the increased protection against executive adventurism in the guise
of foreign policy that legislators have built into different types of
laws.' 4 It has been precisely these protective actions, such as the
NEPA and the Arms Control and Disarmament Act,""6 that have
made executive conformity to such statutes a federal question and
made possible judicial review of otherwise nonjusticiable foreign
policy issues.' Even if the federal courts possess no particular ex-
pertise in resolving specific questions of foreign policy,'07 their role
in analyzing the actions of those charged with the implementation
of U.S. policies can only increase in the years to come.
104. B. SHEPPARD, RETHINKING CONGRESSIONAL REFORM: THE REFORM ROOTS OF THE
SPECIAL INTEREST CONGRESS 313 (1985).
105. Pub. L. No. 87-297, tit. I, § 2, 75 Stat. 631 (1961) (codified as amended at 22
U.S.C. §§ 2551-2591 (1988)).
106. B. SHEPPARD, supra note 104, at 317-18.
107. Crockett v. Reagan; 720 F.2d at 1356.
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B. The Activist Mode
The history of state interference in foreign affairs has taken a
new twist since the Cold War politics of the 1950s.11o While federal
supremacy in foreign affairs remains a pillar of state-federal rela-
tions, the active or behind the scenes encouragement by federal
authorities to support unilateral foreign policy decisions by the
states is well documented. In particular, the State Department has
been supportive of activism where a state's action is in retaliation
to a communist country's policies. In times of strained relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union, there is an in-
creased tendency to tolerate such aggressive state behavior against
a communist foe. 109
The State of Florida, in an effort to show its displeasure with
Cuban leader Fidel Castro's dependence on the Soviet Union, en-
acted legislation permitting the seizure and detention of foreign
fishing vessels in Florida waters if they sailed under the flag of a
communist state. 10 "The pursuit of Cuban fishing vessels created a
diplomatic flap, but Florida's laws were never challenged by the
United States government.""' It remains in force today, although
it raises serious questions of potential violations of international
law.
More recently, collaboration between the federal government
and the States of New York and New Jersey occurred in 1983. In
response to the downing of a South Korean passenger airplane by a
Soviet military jet, the Governors of New York and New Jersey
ordered the port authorities of their respective states to refuse
clearance for landing of the Soviet airplane carrying Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko to a meeting of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly." 2 The United States took no action to prevent the
implementation of these orders which violated both the United
108. C/. Q. WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 265-66 (1922)(ex-
pounding the more traditional view, but also noting past activist positions).
109. Cf. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. at 437-38 (professing that a state's foreign policy
attitude, the freezing or thawing of the "cold war" are matters for the federal government,
not for the local probate courts). See also P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 122.
110. Florida Territorial Waters Act, Fla. Stat. § 370.21 (1963).
111. Moore, supra note 19, at 316. "The timing of the act further supports the conclu-
sion that it largely serves a political purpose and is a product of the Cuban problem, for it
was enacted in early 1963, during a period of severe tension between Cuba and the United
States." Id.
112. See Note, Acts by State Governments Affecting Foreign Relations, 25 HARV. INT'L
L.J 200 (1984).
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States Constitution and the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement.113
The actions of the two governors clearly intruded upon the
foreign relations power of the federal government, and were moti-
vated, not by the states' police powers, but by foreign policy con-
cerns. As such, their actions violated Article I, Section 10 of the
Constitution.
A more recent example of a state and federal conflict con-
cerned the child of a United Nations diplomat from Zimbabwe.
The Commissioner of Social Services for the city of New York con-
fronted the Department of State on whether New York's child pro-
tection laws could prohibit the return of child who had been the
victim of physical and mental abuse to his parents, who were cov-
ered by diplomatic immunity.11' In a decision eventually reviewed
by the Supreme Court,115 the Family Court, City of New York,
Queens County held that the city was forbidden to detain the
child, and that neither the court nor the city government had juris-
diction over the diplomat's child. While achieving a judicial vic-
tory, the Department of State demonstrated its respect for New
York's activism by ensuring that: 1) the father would leave the
country before the City turned over the child to the State Depart-
ment; 2) the State Department would only hand over the child to
the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zimbabwe at the
United Nations; 3) the Government of Zimbabwe would keep the
child under protective custody while bringing child protective pro-
ceedings against the father under Zimbabwe law; and 4) Zimbabwe
law contained comparable procedures to New York law in child
abuse cases."' Only after such assurances did New York decide not
to approve the State Department's motion to dismiss and did the
113. Id. at 201. Article IV, Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement states that be-
tween the United States and the United Nations, "federal, state or local authorities shall
not impose any impediments to transit" to or from "United Nations Headquarters on repre-
sentatives to the United Nations." Agreement between the United Nations and the United
States Regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, United Nations-
United States, 61 Stat. 3416, T.I.A.S. No. 1676.
114. In the Matter of Terrence K., 138 Misc. 2d 611, 524 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Fam. Ct. 1988).
115. Pending appeal of the court's order, the Legal Aid Society as Law Guardian for
Terrence moved in the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, for a stay of the
order and to enjoin the transfer of the child's custody. On December 31, 1987, the Appellate
Division denied the Law Guardian's motion. See In the Matter of Terrence K., 135 A.D.2d
857, 522 N.Y.S.2d 949 (App. Div. 1987).
116. 524 N.Y.S.2d. at 999.
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Family Court actually dismiss the action." 7
Since the late 1950s, state legislatures have enacted various
forms of "Buy-American" statutes."' The possible preemption of
these laws by the Commerce Clause'1 9 makes them a ripe source of
litigation. Although in 1876 the Supreme Court established that
the Commerce Clause protects a commodity from any burdens im-
posed by reason of its foreign origins, 2 ' many courts continue to
uphold state actions, such as requiring the labeling of foreign
goods, finding that the state is merely exercising its police
powers.' 2 '
The federal government, however, often argues that states, by
discriminating against foreign merchandise, are engaged in the
conduct of foreign relations."'2 Yet more recently, the Supreme
Court upheld state procurement policies that give statutory prefer-
ence to domestic products. 2 Underlying the case is the emergence
of the "market participant" exception to the Commerce Clause,
first articulated in Alexandria Scrap.'2 4 and later refined in White
v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers.1 25 This rule
allows immunity from the Commerce Clause where the state acts
in its proprietary capacity. 2 A state, when acting like a private
corporation, should enjoy the same freedoms that corporations
do. 27 The market participant exception operates only in the ab-
sence of congressional action. Thus, by analogy, a state's Buy-
American statute will remain constitutional as long as no federal
117. Id. at 1000.
118. Note, Ordinances Restricting the Sale of "Communist Goods", 65 COLUM. L. Rv.
310 (1965).
119. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
120. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875).
121. See, e.g., Parrott and Company v. Benson, 114 Wash. 117, 194 P. 986 (1921); Terri-
tory v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957)(a Hawaii statute which required labeling on eggs as violating
U.S. commitments under the GATT was invalidated).
122. Frequently, the Department of State will send a letter to the governor of a state
where a conflict exists between state law and American foreign policy. Note, National Power
to Control State Discrimination Against Foreign Goods and Persons: A Study in Federal-
ism, 12 STAN. L. REv. 355, 382 (1960).
123. See Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980).
124. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
125. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
126. See Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in Private Interna-
tional Matters, 5 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 168 (1971).
127. "[Tjhe entry by the state itself into the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a po-
tential article of interstate commerce .. , triggers the market participant exception and cuts
off any further commerce clause inquiry." Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 808. See also
White, 460 U.S. at 209-10.
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law preempts it.""8 However, another school of thought suggests
that the Court would not allow a market participant exception for
foreign commerce.
129
The existence of an overwhelming number of state provisions
in this area, coupled with few federal challenges, suggests at least
some support of such state activities by the federal government.
More importantly, the record concerning such laws at the state
court level is mixed. For example, a California appeals court struck
down a state Buy-American statute as violating the Commerce
Clause and the exclusive federal foreign affairs power.1"' On the
other hand, a New Jersey court, relying on Alexandria Scrap, up-
held a Buy-American statute against Commerce Clause attack. 1 '
One reason why these cases on Buy-American laws are so in-
teresting is because of their analogous legal relationship to the cur-
rent wave of divestment statutes promulgated in many jurisdic-
tions. Yet unlike Buy-American statutes, which have come under
federal and state court scrutiny, the divestment statutes have not
been tested within the context of federalism. A more detailed dis-
cussion of this issue appears in Part III, Section C which considers
neutral behavior modes.
If Buy-American statutes have produced mixed judicial results
in the area of federal preemption, a more recent area of state activ-
ism has not been challenged in the federal courts. States are con-
ducting their own foreign trade policies by using their governors,
high-ranking state officials, and private citizens to negotiate com-
mercial agreements with foreign governments and private corpora-
tions. These private negotiations with foreign governments are ac-
tions clearly proscribed by the Logan Act. 32 This statute, which
dates back to 1799, has been breached by state governments in
pursuit of new markets for their products and increased foreign
128. See Kenworthy, supra note 44, at 20.
129. Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion Upon the Fed-
eral Power in Foreign Policy, 72 VA. L. REv. 813, 840 (1986).
130. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 272 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr.
800 (1969).
131. KSB Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Comm'n, 75
N.J. 272, 381 A.2d 774 (1977).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1988) states:
Any citizen of the United States . . . who, without authority of the United
States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or in-
tercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with in-
tent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any
officer . . . shall be fined. . . . Id.
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investment in their state. 8 ' As two analysts of foreign investment
in the United States have noted, "[it] is the conundrum of the
American federal system that the states have taken the lead on the
issue of foreign investment while at the national level public policy
makers remain curiously inactive."'3 4 Still, clearly the federal gov-
ernment has been supporting such efforts from behind the scenes,
rather than applying any proscriptions to this type of local trade
policy. Such negotiations are an example of state activism at its
best, and a type of activism the federal government tacitly encour-
ages. However, if the activities of the individual states were to be
considered troublesome to either Congress or the Executive, the
policy could shift from federal encouragement or tolerance of this
situation to outright prohibition.
C. The Neutral Mode
The neutral mode for analyzing state behavior encompasses
those types of state activities which neither promote nor contradict
a federal policy as it relates to the conduct of foreign affairs. The
neutral mode contains in it grassroots elements which reflect a
growing demand by the states for a greater role in the making of
foreign policy. In this case, resolutions by a state legislature or a
city council to speak its mind on human rights or to divest local
government pension funds from companies dealing with South Af-
rica have been voted on with increasing frequency in the last dec-
ade. In particular, the most obvious manifestation of this "direct
democracy" during the Reagan years was the use of state and local
initiatives and referenda to do what the Congress and the execu-
tive branch failed to accomplish through legislation or policy
making.
1. Purely Neutral Acts
Many states and local governments have paid tribute to other
nations and foreign citizens through non-binding resolutions, com-
memorative holidays, and specific laws that recognize the diversity
of their citizens and their concern for the freedom of others. Such
133. For example, Virginia Governor Gerald L. Baliles who was on his eighth overseas
trip while in office, has made improving international trade a major goal of his administra-
tion. He was recently in Brussels with officials of the European Economic Community.
Wash. Post, July 7, 1989, at B6, col. 3.
134. S. Tolchin & M. Tolchin, supra note 8, at Cl, col. 1.
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legislative expressions of opinion on United States foreign policy
do not warrant interference by the federal government. These ac-
tions fall within the foreign policy exceptions of the "dormant For-
eign Policy Clause."' 5
For example, the New York City Council renamed an intersec-
tion near the Soviet United Nations Mission "Sakharov-Bonner
Corner."' 8 Such an act, on its face legitimate under notions of fed-
eralism, clearly held a larger political message. The City Council
sought to embarrass the Soviet Union for its harsh treatment of
two human rights activists. 87
Declaring commemorative holidays for certain groups of op-
pressed people is another example of local activism in foreign pol-
icy matters.3 8 Massachusetts has mandated such observances as
"Social Justice Day for Ireland," "Lithuanian Independence Day,"
and "Armenian Martyrs Day."'' 3 The County Executive of Erie
County, New York, on a tour of Poland, declared his support for
the independent Polish Labor movement."'4 In Boston, Mayor
Flynn sent President Reagan a public document decrying British
repression in Northern Ireland."' Former Chicago Mayor Jane
Byrne also got into the foreign policy game when she lamented
conditions in communist Poland in a newspaper interview. 42 In all
these cases, appeal to local constituencies was at the root of such
actions. The underlying rationale for these acts was local politics,
more than intentional meddling in United States foreign relations.
But even if such actions were troublesome to foreign governments,
state and city governments are, absent consent, immune to lawsuit
by foreign governments."3 In all cases, local intrusions into the na-
tion's foreign affairs is considered de minimis.
135. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
136. Human Rights Reminder Posted Near Soviet Mission, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1984,
at B3, col. 1.
137. The United States Congress also changed the address of the Soviet Embassy in
Washington to Andrei Sakharov Plaza. Home Rule Proviso Becomes Law, Wash. Post, Oct.
13, 1984, at C4, col. 5.
138. Governors of all 50 states and over 150 mayors commemorated the fiftieth anniver-
sary of Kristallnacht, November 9-10, at the request of the U.S. Holocaust Council. The
decrees urged constituents to "always strive to overcome prejudice and inhumanity through
understanding, vigilance and resistance." Wash. Jewish W., Nov. 10, 1988, at 17, col. 1.
139. 1B MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 15U, 12GG & 1511 (West 1986).
140. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1981, at C18, col. 3.
141. Boston Globe, Apr. 23, 1984, at 19, col. 1.
142. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 15, 1981, at A15, col. 5.
143. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
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2. Police Power Actions
a) Divestment
The anti-apartheid movement's greatest victories have oc-
curred through the local legislative process. In cities and states
around the country, divestment legislation has been enacted as a
method of retaliation against the racist policies of the South Afri-
can government." The activity at the local level has also been
viewed as a challenge to the Reagan Administration's approach of
"constructive engagement" in our relations with South Africa. For
many local leaders, the use of a boycott as a weapon against the
South African Government's racial policies has become more pow-
erful because states and cities are arguably more easily able to en-
force their actions than the federal government. 4 '
In the last five years, hundreds of state and local governments
have imposed various forms of restrictive policies regarding the in-
vestment of state pension and education funds in corporations do-
ing business in South Africa. Whether such laws are a valid exer-
cise of a state's proprietary function, as defined under the market
participant exception to the Commerce Clause, is yet to be decided
in federal court. At best, the various divestment ordinances and
statutes reflect the inherent tension between the foreign commerce
power and the legitimate exercise of state police power.""
Public pressure to deal with South African apartheid also
forced the hand of Congress in 1985. By mid-year, a package of
sanction legislation which sought to ban loans to the South African
government, restrict exports and new American investment, and
ban the sale of South African Krugerands within the United
States, was making its way through the legislative process.""
The Reagan Administration, however, supported a program of
"constructive engagement." This policy, which highlighted the con-
144. Over $5 billion of holdings from state pension funds have been divested. Note,
supra note 129, at 817.
145. For example, the District of Columbia has a total divestment act. D.C. Council
Committee on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Report, Bill 5-18, at 2 (1983); D.C. Act 5-
76. Neighboring Prince George's County, Maryland passed a divestment measure that is
similar to actions in other jurisdictions around the country. Res. C.R. 190-1985 (Nov. 19,
1985). See also Wash. Post, Dec. 2, 1984, at F4, col. 1.
146. See Note, supra note 122, at 357.
147. H.R. REP. No. 1460, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. H7049-54 (daily ed. Aug.
1, 1985) (conference version of the bill).
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structive role U.S. corporations in South Africa could play to
counter apartheid, was not supported by the United States Con-
gress.'"" Fearing the passage of the more restrictive divestment leg-
islation, President Reagan invoked the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) ' to push forward a less restrictive
sanction package. This package, which also banned any United
States export assistance to U.S. firms operating in South Africa,
did not adhere to the Sullivan Principles.'"0
When President Reagan signed the executive order imposing
these sanctions under the IEEPA, his message admonished Con-
gress on the need to present a unified front in foreign relations.
President Reagan's message stated that "[iun order for this Nation
successfully to influence events in [South Africa], it is necessary
for the United States to speak with one voice and to demonstrate
our opposition to apartheid by taking certain actions directed spe-
cifically at key apartheid policies and agencies."''
In spite of this plea for a united front against apartheid, the
weakness of administration sanctions has only led to a series of
state and local government actions dealing with the apartheid is-
sue. The popularity of divestment of financial holdings has become
a symbol of local action in the face of slower federal actions in this
area.
152
How long will local divestment legislation remain a "neutral
act"? One analysis suggests that under the framework of Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,15 3 Congress could
enact legislation preventing states from taking divestment ac-
tion. 5 4 Yet another view is that under the police power function,
such action constitutes legitimate state regulation of interstate
commerce by expanding the market participant doctrine, although
courts have made it clear that the doctrine is not normally applica-
148. Id. Presumably Congress could act under Garcia, to pass legislation denying the
states a right to divestment actions.
149. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982). The IEEPA was passed to deal with the threat to
national security, foreign policy and economic order of the United States.
150. See Note, supra note 129, at 830.
151. Economic Sanctions Against South Africa, 21 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc. 1054, 1055
(Sept. 9, 1985).
152. As of 1987, 47 cities had adopted divestment ordinances as had six counties. Lewis,
supra note 48, at 474. This type of local action is not limited to South Africa. In 1986, the
New York City Council president called for divestment of holdings in firms doing business
in Libya. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
153. Supra note 2.
154. See Note, supra note 129, at 841.
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ble to foreign commerce."'
Moreover, there has been discussion of the important moral
character of divestment, which legitimizes the police power of the
state. The argument suggests that to not divest is to risk local so-
cial unrest because of popular dissatisfaction with public monies
going to support a racist social policy.1 5 6 Counter to this reasoning,
however, is the long-term effect such morally based local legislation
has on the conduct of foreign relations at the national level, which
runs counter to most constitutional theory."'
Whether a federal court will ultimately declare that state di-
vestment measures are preempted by the Constitution is currently
moot. Until now, no private corporate challenges have attempted
to check state divestment laws, mainly because corporations fear
that initiating such lawsuits would result in more bad publicity
than the damages sought."5 8 But just as the neutral mode reflects
federal tolerance of actions which clearly infringe on the foreign
affairs powers, it also implies that the time may come when Con-
gress acts to reflect the popular will already reflected in the state's
actions. Ending commercial relations with a nation whose policies
are so distasteful to our own public policy may warrant such fed-
eral legislation.
b) Sanctuary
One of the more controversial uses of state police power in-
volves the sanctuary movement. The sanctuary movement shelters
Central Americans who have come to the United States as a result
of the civil wars in their region.
City councils in Los Angeles, Seattle, and Atlanta have passed
resolutions declaring those cities sanctuaries.1 59 The State of New
Mexico, by resolution of its former Governor, Toney Anaya, has
155. See Bob-Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 338 U.S. 28 (1948). See also New York Times
v. City of New York Comm'n on Human Rights, 41 N.Y.2d 345, 361 N.E.2d 963, 393
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1977) (when the New York City Council tried to ban advertisements for em-
ployment in South Africa based companies, the state supreme court viewed that action as
an "infringement on an authority vested conclusively in the federal government.").
156. See Lewis, supra note 49, at 516.
157. "This state and local legislation, if unchecked by the courts, could tie the hands of
the federal government .. " Note, supra note 129, at 849. "Any legislation that purposely
undermines federal policy within the realm of foreign affairs should be struck down." Id.
158. Id.
159. Wash. Post, Nov. 28, 1985, at A51, col. 1.
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also been declared a sanctuary. 60
Declaring sanctuaries of cities and states through the police
power function differs from legislation which supports divestment.
Supporters of divestment argue that the policy to sell securities of
corporations which have holdings in South Africa is one which af-
fects local monies and, therefore, falls clearly within the state's
"market participant" power. The sanctuary movement conflicts
with federal law and policies in a way which is far more problem-
atic than divestment. 8' In particular, critics of the sanctuary
movement cite the efforts of local governments to circumvent con-
gressional powers to regulate immigration, clearly one of Congress'
plenary powers. 162 While no statutory limit exists on the number of
refugees that can be admitted into the United States in any year,
as a matter of executive policy, the President does determine the
actual number to be admitted.'6 3 The presidential determination
for refugee admissions is so limited for Central America (4,000 in
1987 out of an annual ceiling of 75,000 set by the President) that
an alien fleeing that region has little chance of being admitted to
the United States with refugee status.'64
The whole problem of the sanctuary movement merely reflects
the broader policy questions of illegal immigration from Central
America that arise out of our failed foreign policy approach to that
region. As one commentator noted: "Sadly, American refugee pol-
icy is being reflected through an ideological prism, with this bot-
tom line result. If you are fleeing a regime that the current admin-
istration does not like, your chances of being allowed to stay in the
U.S. are good."'6" Refugees fleeing countries with political regimes
supported by the United States, such as El Salvador, Honduras,
and Guatemala, encounter more problems than persons fleeing
Communist or other totalitarian states."6
160. Anaya, Sanctuary: Because There Are Still Many Who Wait for Death, 15 HOF-
STRA L. ReV. 101 (1986).
161. Some observers argue that the federal government, by not offering sanctuary to
Central American refugees, violates U.S. obligations under international law. Id. at 104.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,
339 (1914)("Over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress so complete.").
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (1988).
164. Schmidt, Refuge in the U.S.: The Sanctuary Movement Should Use the Legal
System, 15 HOFSTRA L. Rev. 79, 81 (1986).
165. Anaya, supra note 160, at 104-05.
166. According to the statistics on different nationalities' request for political asylum in
the United States, 49% of Poles were granted asylum and 66% of Iranians, compared to 7%
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What is most surprising about the sanctuary movement is the
federal government's restraint in pursuing illegal aliens seeking
refuge in sanctuary areas. "The government has not sought to
enter churches to arrest aliens believed to be in the United States
illegally.' 1 6 7 However, this neutral stance by the federal govern-
ment, in the face of clear violations of federal immigration powers
by state and municipal governments, can also shift to a more tradi-
tional, preemptive stance when individuals involved in the sanctu-
ary movement actively engage in smuggling illegal aliens. 1 8 Like
cases involving nuclear protestors, it is clear that there is a fine
line between neutral behavior by the federal government and the
traditional stance in federal predominance in foreign affairs.
The government's tolerance of sanctuary cities (which are
open violations of the federal power to regulate foreign affairs)
while prosecuting some of the sanctuary movement's leaders, re-
flects the executive agencies' reluctance to challenge state police
powers. It is this double standard that makes the sanctuary and
divestment movements so representative of the new federalism of
the 1980s." 9
3. Initiatives and Referenda
When citizens of Chicago went to the polls in March 1988 to
select a presidential nominee, they also had an opportunity to vote
on United States foreign policy in Central America. An advisory
referendum17 ° on the local ballot asked: "Considering the current
state of civil unrest occurring in Central America, should the Illi-
nois National Guard troop training in Central America be halted"?
This question passed by a two to one margin in the primary."'
for Nicaraguans and 2% of Salvadorans. Id. at 105.
167. Schmidt, supra note 164, at 98. See also San Francisco Chron., Mar. 28, 1986, at
11, col. 1 (quoting Allan Nelson, INS Commissioner: "The agency does not request search
warrants to enter churches suspected of sheltering Central Americans who claim that they
have entered the United States to escape death, arrest or torture in their native countries.").
168. United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 945
(1987).
169. Schmidt, supra note 164, at 99.
170. A referendum is a bill passed by a state legislature, or other local legislative body,
and referred to a public vote by citizen petition. The bill cannot go into effect until and
unless, approved by the majority of voters casting ballots on the proposition. An initiative is
a proposed ordinance, city or county charter amendment, statute or state constitutional
amendment, placed on the ballot by citizen petition. INITIATIVE PROCEDURES: A FIFTY STATE
SUVEY 15 (D. Schmidt ed. 1983).
171. 9 INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM RPT., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 19.
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Those who supported this referendum believed that a dispropor-
tionate number of blacks and hispanics from Chicago were being
sent to train in Honduras.17
Such an exercise of direct democracy 7 3 comes at the end of a
decade marked by local involvement in areas traditionally within
the domain of the federal government. 174 Cities and states have
used the initiative and referenda process to bring national issues to
the attention of local constituents. 175
One of the most recent efforts to bring foreign policy debates
to a local resolution occurred on November 8, 1988, in cities in Cal-
ifornia and Massachusetts in ballot propositions relating to United
States policy in the Middle East. In San Francisco, "Proposition
W" called for the United States to recognize the Palestinian "right
to self-determination and statehood in the occupied territories of
the West Bank and Gaza. . . ." In Berkeley, "Measure J" called
for a sister-city relationship between Berkeley and the Palestinian
refugee camp of Jabaliya in Gaza. The Berkeley City Council de-
feated the measure in March, but proponents of the measure were
successful in getting the initiative on the November ballot. Both
initiatives were defeated.'76
In Cambridge, Massachusetts, "Question 5" called for a public
referendum on the establishment of an independent Palestinian
state in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the severance of U.S.
aid to Israel. Although this initiative was successful, obviously its
implementation is doubtful. A similar referendum on the ballot in
Newton, Massachusetts, calling on the United States Government
to support "the principles of self-determination for the Israeli and
Palestinian people; the creation of a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip next to Israel; and security for Israel and the
172. Id.
173. See D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1984) (describing, in detail, the nature of direct democracy in the United
States).
174. Holcomb, supra note 56. "Not only did legislative activity in the states pick up
after 1980, but the number of state initiatives, a favorite tool of citizen groups, also in-
creased substantially. In the 1982 elections, almost 200 ballot propositions were voted on in
all 50 states." Id.
175. P. McGUIGAN, THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 1980S: CASE STUDIES IN
POPULAR DECISIONMAKING 23 (1985).
176. Correspondence with the Joint Action Committee for Political Affairs, Highland
Park, Illinois (Oct. 26, 1988); Telephone interview with staff member from the America
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Washington, D.C., (Nov. 10, 1988).
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Palestinian state," was defeated. 7'
With the exception of the Berkeley resolution to create a sis-
ter-city program, the other ballot questions crossed the line into
powers reserved for the President and Congress in the conduct of
United States foreign policy. Nevertheless, the grassroots efforts to
bring the question of Middle East policy to a local vote presents a
citizens' call to the foreign policy elite and to members of Congress
to alleviate a festering situation that threatens global security.
While the majority of initiatives focused on purely domestic
issues, foreign policy and arms control matters figured prominently
in local campaigns during the 1980s.17 e The nuclear freeze move-
ment spread as a national referendum on arms control. "The nu-
clear freeze initiative won in nine of ten states where it was on the
ballot in 1982; nuclear freeze resolutions passed in 320 city councils
and fifty-six county councils, as well as eleven state legislatures
and hundreds of town meetings." '179 These non-binding resolutions
had a powerful impact on federal lawmakers. 80 In 1983, Congress
proposed similar resolutions that would freeze the production and
testing of all nuclear weapons. 8' Some analysts believe this
"trickle up" approach to arms control reflected the high level of
public anxiety over the deterioration of negotiations with the Sovi-
ets over nuclear weapons during the first Reagan term.'82 By 1984,
the freeze movement had shifted its attention to the creation of
"nuclear free zones." By the spring of 1986, 110 localities in the
United States had declared themselves nuclear free zones. 8 3
Even though grassroots concerns about foreign relations lay at
the heart of the nuclear freeze movement, such manifestations of
free speech did come under state judicial scrutiny. In a 1984 deci-
sion, the Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the nuclear weapons
freeze concept was not an appropriate subject for popular consider-
177. P. McGUmAN, supra note 175.
178. Holcomb, supra note 56, at 124.
179. P. McGuIGAN, supra note 175, at 13-14. The freeze was defeated only in the State
of Arizona.
180. Pierce & Anderson, Nuclear Freeze Proponents Mobilize on Local Referenda
House Elections, NAT'L J., Sept. 18, 1982, at 1602-05.
181. Towell, H.J. Res. 13: After 13 Hours of Debate Nuclear Freeze not Resolved,
CONG. Q., Mar. 19, 1983, at 546-48. H.J. Res. 13 addressed a freeze on testing, production or
deployment of nuclear weapons or the delivery vehicles.
182. Towell, Reagan Arms Control Policy Faces Two Hill Challenges, CONG. Q., Feb.
19, 1983, at 369.
183. P. McGuIGAN, supra note 175, at 20. Two towns in Maryland and one in Oregon
declared themselves nuclear free zones. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1986, at A15, col. 1.
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ation through the initiative process. 84 The court upheld an admin-
istrative ruling issued the previous fall by the Nebraska Secretary
of State which had prohibited a vote on the nuclear freeze.185
A similar lawsuit was filed in New York City to prevent a ref-
erendum on a nuclear free zone from appearing on the ballot. 86 In
1985, the New York Court of Appeals issued an injunction to the
Board of Elections prohibiting the referendum. Underlying this
referendum was an effort by some city council members to amend
the portions of the city's charter authorizing the disposition of city
property and thus preventing federal military installations
"designed to carry and store nuclear weapons"' 87 from being lo-
cated in New York. According to the court, the proposed ballot
referendum "would interfere with the federal government's power
to provide for the defense of the nation and thus would be uncon-
stitutional under the United States Constitution, article I, section
8.99188
These challenges to state court decisions on initiative and ref-
erendum efforts were exceptions. The distinguishing factor in each
of the above challenges was the specificity of the language of the
referenda to bind localities to commit unconstitutional acts. What
is more impressive is the number of initiatives relating to foreign
policy matters that did reach voters in states and cities across the
country.
Some observers are not convinced that the intervention of the
judiciary in such matters is over.'89 The involvement of state
courts in the political processes of initiatives and referenda is not a
hopeful sign. Since late 1983, courts have intervened to remove
ballot items before elections on such diverse issues as redistricting,
abortion, constitutional conventions, and tax reduction on the ba-
sis of separation of powers. Apparently, at stake is whether ballot
initiatives can replace legislative action. 90
Whether the federal government will intervene to challenge
these expressions of local opinion in foreign affairs is highly doubt-
184. Brant v. Beermann, 217 Neb. 632, 350 N.W.2d 18 (1984).
185. Id.
186. Fossella v. Dinkins, 66 N.Y.2d 162, 485 N.E.2d 1017, 495 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1985).
187. Id. at 163, 485 N.E.2d at 1018, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
188. Id.
189. McGuigan, Direct Democracy and the 1984 Election, 2 ELECTIONS & POL. 21
(1984-85).
190, Id. at 24.
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ful. With regard to non-binding resolutions, an aggressive federal
reaction to prevent such questions from appearing on ballots would
be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts on first amendment
grounds. Barring compelling reasons by the federal government to
prevent an initiative from going forward (national security reasons
would be the most obvious grounds for intervention) it seems such
grassroots commentary on national policy will continue. It seems
unlikely that any administration would be willing to risk a con-
frontation on basic constitutional principles for the sole benefit of
speaking with one voice in foreign affairs.
4. Summary
The 1980s were a boom period for the use of the ballot box to
express local sentiments on such wide ranging issues as environ-
mental quality, social justice, and United States-Soviet relations.19
Some politicians concede that in 1982 the United States actually
had a national referendum on the nuclear freeze, since eleven
states and thirty-two local jurisdictions passed ballot initiatives on
this issue.1 92 This action has been taken in the area of foreign rela-
tions despite case law that suggests that no state may act to exac-
erbate relations with foreign nations. 93
The fine line between an activist mode and a neutral mode is
often determined by current events. Public opinion can frequently
turn a state's action under its police powers into a national cause
clbre if the situation suits the broad goals of our foreign rela-
tions. Thus, such state actions as divestment of state pension
funds in corporations doing business with South Africa and the
federal government's refusal to take action against a state or city
whose legislature declares its entire territory a sanctuary for refu-
gees demonstrate the fluidity of federal tolerance of a state's inde-
pendent voice in foreign affairs.
V. CONCLUSION
Have we entered a new age of state involvement in foreign pol-
icy which contradicts traditional theory that the federal govern-
ment alone is supreme in the conduct of foreign relations? The ex-
191. Wall St. J., Nov. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
192. P. McGUIGAN, supra note 175, at 67.
193. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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amples discussed suggest a new activism on the state and local
level to speak out on current international affairs. The actual suc-
cess of challenges to the federal government's supremacy is less ap-
parent. Court cases reveal a tremendous deference to the federal
power in general and the executive in particular, when it comes to
questions of foreign policy. What has yet to be challenged is a state
or municipality's ability to conduct an independent foreign policy
through a state's use of its police power. Clearly the cases of di-
vestiture of investments from South African companies, the nu-
clear free zone ordinances, and the recognition of sanctuary for po-
litical refugees by cities and states, point to a different approach to
an old problem. Is this mere free expression, or is it a new wrinkle
in the conduct of foreign affairs in the last decades of this century?
Thus far, the tolerance for actions in such matters suggests
that certain areas of foreign relations may lie with the states. An
alternative explanation would equate these actions by state gov-
ernments with the role of surrogate legislators for a Congress that
has often been unable to reach a consensus on controversial issues
that relate to foreign policy. By expressing discontent with the ac-
tions of other nations or governments or by taking actions affecting
foreign policy decisions of the federal government, the state action
takes on additional importance in the way our nation interacts
with other nations. The theory being that if Congress will not act,
at least the grassroots will attempt to address pressing issues such
as South African apartheid, the civil wars in Central America, and
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of course, these state and lo-
cal actions are non-binding on the federal government.
What role the federal judiciary will ultimately play in this de-
bate depends on whether the executive or the legislative branches
choose to quash the independent actions of state and municipal
governments through the courts. Currently, the record of federal
opposition to state incursions into foreign affairs has been mixed.
It is often limited to violations of treaties or questions of
preemption.
Whether the federal government supports, opposes or remains
neutral toward a given state or local action depends on the extent
to which such an action promotes or hinders national foreign pol-
icy goals. What is becoming more evident in the 1980s is an ex-
panding range of issues where the federal government is either in-
different or neutral to such actions. Through clever use of police
powers, states are making headway in promoting an independent
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voice in foreign affairs.
How troublesome is this trend? At present, grassroots initia-
tives and legislative referenda, while binding only at the local level,
in some cases have material consequences at the national level.
They reflect an increased awareness of national policies in foreign
relations and an important adjunct to the policy-making process.
Rather than viewing these state actions as confrontations with the
federal authorities, these acts may actually be perceived as a way
of bringing the policy process back to the people. Such interest at
the local level may also provide an additional impetus to legislators
who may, in the future, need to pay closer attention to their con-
stituents' views on matters which extend beyond the geographic
confines of the congressional districts they represent.
